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CEO Entrenchment and Performance: New 
Evidence Using Nonlinear Principal Component 
Analysis 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study revisits the link between CEO Entrenchment and performance from a sample of 
1.040 annual observations concerning 138 CEOs of French-listed firms for the 2000-2013 
period. The effect of entrenchment, which seems to represent an illustration of the 
effectiveness of control mechanisms that CEOs are supposed to undergo within firms, reveals 
ambiguous findings. The financial woes, suffered by some firms such as France Telecom, 
Vivendi Universal and Eurotunnel testify to the magnitude of this inefficiency and usefulness 
to discuss corporate governance principles. The VIENOT reports 1 and 2 and the Bouton 
report have come forward presenting recommendations aimed at implement a system of 
corporate governance where moral ethics of different actors, confidence, transparency and 
respect for the interests of stakeholders are consistent. The purpose of this paper is thus to 
understand the impact of entrenchment on French firm performance. A key aspect of our study 
is the use of Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis (NLPCA), which is preferred to 
standard principal component analysis as a more effective method to distill the complex 
dimensions of CEO Entrenchment into reliable summary scores. Using fixed/random effect 
models which control of different source of heterogeneity, we find that CEO Entrenchment has 
a modest association with operating measures of performance (i.e. ratio of earnings to total 
assets, ROA) and with market-based measures of performance (i.e. Tobin’s Q). The empirical 
findings also indicate that the magnitude of the economic significance of the entrenchment 
proxies in the performance models depends on the method utilized to measure CEO 
Entrenchment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of entrenchment reflected, in general, the idea of not being able to be easily moved 
from the place where you are. Indeed, the entrenchment of the leader reflects its determination 
to overcome the control of shareholders to adopt a freedom of action and benefit both from 
pecuniary and non pecuniary advantages. 
 
First, the entrenchment of leaders is considered one of the important means helping to create 
business value; on the other hand it can be harmful and has negative effects on performance. 
He has conducted several empirical and theoretical researches at a time. The idea is that some 
mention the existence of a + or - significant link between the rooting and performance. While 
others emphasize non-significant results.  The question of our problem we pose in this regard 
is: In what measure the performance will be affected by the entrenchment of leaders within 
French companies? 
 
The entrenchment models presented by previous studies remain limited because they have 
retained a limited number of variables. Indeed, the studies Morck et al. (1988) and Short and 
Keasy (1999) did not take into account the personal characteristics of the leader and Pigé  
model (1998) did not address the relationship between the leaders and the company's various 
shareholders. In our modeling, we will consider as well as the relationship between the leaders 
and directors and between the leaders and the various shareholders of the company (mainly by 
creating two managerial entrenchment indexes by ACP and ACP non-linear). 
 
We use ACP to measure the managerial entrenchment. It allows us to combine a broad set of 
governance variables in the construction of a primary component of entrenchment. It allows us 
to combine a broad set of governance variables in the construction of a primary component of 
entrenchment. To ensure the robustness of our results, we will examine the relationship 
between entrenchment of   leaders and performance, but by constructing another entrenchment 
measure as: The Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis, NLPCA. 
 
The non-linear principal component is based on auto-associative neural network (auto 
encoder), Matthias Scholz (2012). NLPCA is preferred to linear extraction methods because it 
allows both to reduce the dimensionality and to bring closer the non-linear structures in a 
specific set of data (see Scholz and Vigário, 2002; Lintingetal.2007). 
 
 
 
II- CEO ENTRENCHMENT INDEX CONSTRUCTION AND HYPOTHESES  
Following the work of (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Cai Qian & Liu, 2015; Devos, 
Elliott, & Warr, 2015; Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda, 2014; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Florackis 
& Ozkan 2009; Harjoto, 2009; Jiang, Adams, & Jia-Upreti, 2012; Kesten, 2011; K. Lee & 
Yeo, 2010; S. Lee, 2012; Pokharel, 2014; Sheu & Lee, 2012; Yuan, 2009) we construct our 
entrenchment index  of 138 French CEOs from a combination of corporate governance 
variables and variables related to the personal characteristics of leaders using the method of 
principal component analysis ACP and PCNL. 
 
(Yuan, 2009) constructed an entrenchment index that includes ownership of CEO, duality, its 
age, its capital and experience. (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009) incorporate in their entrenchment 
index the percentage of voting rights, the concentration of capital and the compose variables of 
the administration board and remuneration structure. For (Sheu & Lee, 2012), their 
entrenchment index was built by five components: the affiliated directors (directors who have 
business relations with the company), the independent outside directors (directors who seem to 
have no relationship with the company, except for being a part of its administration board ), the 
percentage of voting rights, duality and a compensation ratio. (Pokharel, 2014)  includes in its 
entrenchment index only three variables related to the number of shares held by the CEO, his 
duality and seniority. Similarly, (K. Lee & Yeo, 2010) used three variables in achieving the 
entrenchment index: duality, the seniority of the CEO and the independent outside directors. 
 Following the work elaborated by Berger and Ofek Yermack (1997), we define our managerial 
entrenchment index as the measure to which leaders manage to neutralize the discipline of 
corporate control mechanisms. By this definition, the managerial entrenchment is manifested 
by the influence or managerial power. In the measure of managerial entrenchment we associate 
the set of corporate governance characteristics that may be associated with specific capacities 
of leaders and their discretionary powers which allows them to expropriate the wealth of 
shareholders (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). The component variables of our entrenchment index 
are: 
 
AG + HCAP + TEN + CEOWN + DA +BS + DUAL +IND  + NCB + COMIND. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  the entrenchment is harmful: Sleifer and Vishny (1989) and Morck et al. 
(1990), among others, have argued that the entrenchment is harmful because it allows them to 
be released in part of the control that shareholders can exercise on their management by 
linking the profitability of the firm to their presence and that via monitoring the strategy of 
specific investments that reduces the concurrence on the employment market. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: the entrenchment is beneficial: entrenchment lead managers to choose 
riskier projects and therefore more profitable for partners and shareholders in particular. In 
addition, Castanias and Helfat (1992), focused on managerial income created due to specific 
capacities related to leaders. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources  
Our sample includes 80 French firms belong to index SBF 120. The financial data are hand 
collected using annual reports, Paris Market Exchange and websites of selected firms. Our data 
covers 2001-2013 periods. Overall, we have 80 firms over a period of 13 years (1.040 
observations). The use of panel data, we give advantage to benefit from the both, individual 
and temporal dimensions of the available information. 
 
1. Methodology 
 
This study provides further insights into the CEO entrenchment-performance relationship 
by showing a new method for measuring CEO entrenchment. Specifically, using Nonlinear 
Principal Components Analysis (NLPCA) to combine several CEO attributes, such as 
ownership, age, tenure and board structure… 
This method is a non-linear extension of the standard principal components approach and 
enables the construction of partly robust and reliable entrenchment proxies. This is because, in 
contrast to  linear  extraction  methods, NLPCA relaxes the assumption that each of the CEO 
attributes contributes equally to the entrenchment score, automatically producing weights such 
that the entrenchment proxy explains much of the variance in the group of CEO entrenchment 
attributes. More importantly, NLPCA enables the extraction of complex features from a high 
dimensional dataset by allowing for potential nonlinearities across CEO attributes. To this end, 
the utilization of the specific method can help reduce the measurement error in the obtained 
entrenchment proxies. 
 
 
Our empirical analysis sheds additional light on the lack of consensus on the relationship 
between entrenchment and performance. In particular, our results show that the level of 
economic significance of the entrenchment indicators in the performance models critically 
depends on the method employed to measure CEO entrenchment. Overall, the analysis 
supports the use of NLPCA as a more appropriate way to construct generalized CEO 
entrenchment metrics. This is mainly the case in studies that are based on large datasets that 
include both nominal and ordinal variables (see Linting et al. 2007). 
 
The Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis Method 
 
 
Using NLPCA to assemble a wide set of firm- specific characteristics into a smaller set of 
meaningful and reliable CEO entrenchment summary scores is one of the main contributions 
introduced by this study. NLPCA is better to linear extraction methods because it permits for 
both dimensionality reduction and approximation of nonlinear structures in a specific dataset 
(see Scholz and Vigário, 2002; Linting et al. 2007). Any dataset can be written as an m×n 
matrix: Xij, where m is the number of observed variables (1≤i≤m) and n is the number of 
observations (1≤j≤n).  In  the context of our study m resembles the number of considered 
governance attributes and n is the total number of firm-year observations over the period under  
examination.
2
 
 
the following feature extraction problem is solved by NLPCA: Given Xij  as described 
above and  1≤k<m,  find   the   functions  : m     a k and  : k  a m ,  such  that  
the   quantity 
m 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 m     n 2
 
MSE  ∑∑ Yij    X ij   is  minimized,  where  for  all  observations  1≤j≤n  the  following 
mn i1 j 1 
expression  holds: Y j   ( o  ) X j , with X j ,Y j    .  The operating symbol  ◦  means   the 
 
composition of the functions, i.e.  o  (x)    (x). Put simply, function  maps the original 
data (Xij) to a (smaller) k-dimensional space and function  maps this back to the original 
m- dimensional space while the composite function maps the original dataset to a k-
dimensional nonlinear manifold embedded in the m-dimensional space (  o  : m  a m ) 
in such a way  that the output data (Yij) is obtained by minimizing the mean squared  error 
(MSE).  In  this  sense,  the  output  Yij    is  the  optimal  approximation,  also  known  as  
the  noise  reduced representation, of the original dataset.
3
 
 
the framework of a five-layer feed-forward neural network can solve the nonlinear principle 
component analysis, which has the so-called bottleneck structure (see Kramer, 1991).
4 
The 
network used to implement NLPCA in our analysis is illustrated in Figure 1. In this 
symmetric network information is propagating upwards and its structure can be represented 
 
2 
Each specific column of Xij corresponds to a vector containing all governance attributes for a given company at a 
specific point in time (jth sample: Xj
m 
) and each specific row contains  information  on  a  particular  
governance attribute for all firm-year observations (ith variable: Xi 
n   
). 
3  
It is interesting to note that LPCA is a special case of NLPCA where the functions  and  are restricted to be 
linear transformations and, thus, they can be represented by matrices (i.e. ij  is a k×m matrix while ij  is a m×k 
matrix and ij=ji). 
4  
For an introduction to neural networks see Campbell et al. (1997) and references   therein. 
 
 
  
by the notation [9-4-1-4-9],  based to the number of neurons  in  each of the consecutive 
layers.
5 
In general, the first (input) and  fifth  (output)  layers  each contain m neurons which 
correspond to the data dimension and the third (bottleneck) layer consists of k neurons. The 
transfer functions of these layers are linear. In order to account for nonlinear transformations, 
the second (encoding) and fourth (decoding) layers, each with l number      of      neurons,      
have      nonlinear      transfer      functions,      usually    hyperbolic 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown by Cybenko (1989), by using a three-layer feed-forward neural network with 
hyperbolic tangent transfer functions in the second layer, one can approximate any continuous 
function to arbitrary accuracy, given that the number of neurons in the second layer is 
sufficiently large. The feature extraction problem of NLPCA can then be solved  using this  
result by constructing a five-layer bottleneck structure composed of two three-layer sub- 
networks sharing a common (bottleneck) layer. The first sub-network (layers 1-3) performs the 
extraction function : m a k  , which means that each sample is extracted or projected onto  
the k-dimensional space, while the consecutive part (layers 3-5) is responsible for applying the 
generation function : k a m . The overall structure of the network employs the composition 
of  these  two  functions  (  o  : m  a m ),  which  allows  the  determination  of  the network 
output for the jth observation Y j  ,   where Y j   ( o  ) X j for  1≤j≤n.  The  network parameters 
 
(weights  and  biases)  are  iteratively  adjusted  using  a  conjugate  gradient  algorithm  until the 
 
 
 
 
5  
In the context of our analysis m=9, as there are nine corporate governance attributes examined (see Section 2.2). 
 
 
1 m     n 2
 
mean  squared  error MSE  ∑∑ Yij    X ij   is  minimized  (see  Monahan,  2000).
mn i1 
 
j 1
12 
 
 
Such minimization process ensures that the network output matches the network input as 
closely as possible.
6
 
 
 
3.2 Variables Measurement  
 
Table 1: Performance variables 
 
 
Variables Notation Mesure 
 
Return On Assets   
 
ROA 
 
ROA= Net income ⁄ Total assets 
 
Tobin's Q ratio 
 
Tobin's Q 
 
Tobin's Q = Total Market Value of 
Firm / Total Asset Value 
                                                                                                                       
 
Table 2: Variables related to personal characteristics of the leader 
 
 
Variables Notation Mesure 
 
Age                                                                             
 
AG 
 
Age of CEO in years 
 
 
Human capital 
 
HCAP 
 
 
The warrant seniority of a CEO in the firm 
(as an administrator) 
 
duration in position of 
leader 
 
TEN 
 
expressed by the number of years in the 
CEO position in the company 
 
 
relative power related the 
property to CEO 
 
 
OWN 
 
 
The relationship between managerial 
property and total property 
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opportunistic 
manipulation of earnings 
 
 
DA 
 
The Discretionary Accruals are the residues 
of the estimated acruals by the model 
Kathori et al (2005) 
 
 
Table 3: Governance variables 
 
 
Variables Notation Mesure 
 
Internal control 
mechanisms 
 
  
The size of the 
administration board 
BS Total number of administrators on the board 
 
Cumulation of functions 
of CEO and president of 
the administration board 
 
DUAL 
 
Variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the 
president of the board, and 0 if not 
 
 
Independence of 
Administrators 
 
IND 
 
 
Independence is expressed by the number of 
independent administrators on the board 
 
 
The number of Board 
Committees 
 
NCB 
 
 
Total number of committees in the board 
 
 
Independence of Board 
Committees 
 
COMIND 
 
 
COMIND = total independent administrators 
of all committees / total administrators of all 
committees 
 
 
External control 
mechanisms 
 
  
 
Agency cost 
 
AGENCY 
The asset turnover ratio defined as the ratio 
of annual revenue compared to total assets 
Sales or Revenues / total assets 
 
 
The market for goods and 
services 
 
LNSALES 
 
 
The natural logarithm of annual net sales 
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Table 4: The variables related to corporate characteristics 
 
 
Variables Notation Mesure 
 
 
The corporate size 
 
LNASSET 
 
 
The natural logarithm of total assets 
The market 
capitalization 
LNMKTVAL The natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the corporate 
 
 
The age of the corporate 
 
FIRMAGE 
 
 
The logarithm of the number of fiscal years 
in practice 
 
 
Indebtedness 
 
DEBTRATIO 
 
 
The book value of debts / total assets 
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
We start the empirical results when using PCA then, we focus on results using NLPC.  
For our four model, we did not find any mutlicolliniarity problem and Hausman tests 
indicated that fixed effect is always preferred to random effect due to the presence of 
correlated specific effect in our panel. 
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Firm Size Component = 0,586 * LN (Sales) + 0,614* LN (Assets) + 0,529 * 
LN (Mktval) : The first component is significant (Eigenvalues = 2.2881) and 
explains 76% of the variance of the variables. 
 
 
ENTINDEX =  0,161137*AG + 0,479732*HCAP + 0,514526*TEN + 
0,377202*CEOWN + 0,0862454*DA - 0,364733*BS + 0,240802*DUAL - 
0,275087*IND - 0,224016*NCB + 0,112086*COMIND.  : The first four 
components are significant (Eigenvalues [PC1, PC2, PC3, PC4] = [2.1411; 
1.8705; 1.5616; 1.0290]) and explains 66% of the variance of the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENTINDEX : 
Variable Obs Moyenne Ecart type Min Max 
ENTINDEX 1040 13.54288 8.255597 -1.385639 52.70869 
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Table 1 : Fixed effect model PCA 
 
VARIABLES ROA TOBINSQ 
   
AGENCYCOST 0.01498*** -0.06676*** 
 (0.00213) (0.02333) 
ENTINDEX 0.00174*** 0.02298*** 
 (0.00048) (0.00525) 
PCFS 0.00920*** -0.12972*** 
 (0.00185) (0.02030) 
FIRMAGE -0.02038*** -0.03201 
 (0.00312) (0.03422) 
DEBTRATIO 0.06849* -0.50198 
 (0.03670) (0.40257) 
Constant 0.05349 4.30382*** 
 (0.03337) (0.36604) 
   
Observations 1,040 1,040 
R-squared 0.22942 0.15318 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We can say that a positive relationship between performance and entrenchment is very 
obvious to our sample and for whatever performance proxy. The coefficient of the 
entrenchment variable is positive and significant at the 1% for our two models. This proves 
that the entrenchment is beneficial to shareholders' wealth, highlights the role of skills and 
incomes generated by the management team and corroborating the results of Castanias and 
Helfat (1992). by entrenchment within the corporate, the leader sufficiently entrenched or 
rooted seeks to implement strategies to enhance the company. 
 
 
NLPC results 
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Figure 1 NLENTINDEX 
Bottleneck auto-associative network performing symmetric NLPCA 
This Figure presents the bottleneck network used in our study which can be represented by the 
notation [10-4-1-4-10] according to the number of neurons in consecutive layers. This structure 
has ten inputs and outputs as well as one bottleneck unit corresponding to a transformation from 
a ten dimensional (m=10) space into a one-dimensional one (k=1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 NLPCFS 
Bottleneck auto-associative network performing symmetric NLPCA 
This Figure presents the bottleneck network used in our study which can be represented by the 
notation [3-4-1-4-3] according to the number of neurons in consecutive layers. This structure has 
three inputs and outputs as well as one bottleneck unit corresponding to a transformation from a 
three dimensional (m=3) space into a one-dimensional one (k=1) 
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NLPC ENTRENCHMENT INDEX 
Moyenne 56.71844 
Ecart type 2.272813 
Minimum 52.01817 
Maximum 60.81515 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Fixed Fffect model NLPC 
 
 
VARIABLES ROA TOBINSQ 
   
AGENCYCOST 0.02400*** -0.04413*** 
 (0.00761) (0.01038) 
NLENTINDEX 0.00443*** 0.03557* 
 (0.00170) (0.01914) 
NLPCFS -0.00585 -0.53971*** 
 (0.00432) (0.10623) 
FIRMAGE -0.01515*** -0.05470*** 
 (0.00540) (0.02072) 
DEBTRATIO -0.13057*** -1.03316*** 
 (0.02007) (0.29020) 
CONSTANT -0.04194 5.43831*** 
 (0.09255) (0.98710) 
   
Observations 1,040 1,040 
R-squared 0.15229 0.21020 
Standard errors in parentheses ? *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Stata displays, for both models, a pseudo R2 of 15% for the model of ROA and 21% for 
Tobin's Q model. The coefficient of the managerial entrenchment index extract CPA 
nonlinear (NLENTINDEX) is positive and significant for models of ROA and Tobin's Q 
(respectively 0.00443 and 0.03557) at the 1% and 10%. This proves that the entrenchment is 
beneficial to shareholders' wealth and creates significant managerial incomes for the 
company. This thus disavowing the results of Morck et al (1988) and confirmed our results 
based on managerial entrenchment index extract of the CPA. 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The coefficients of the managerial entrenchment indexes extracted either CPA or nonlinear ACP are 
positive and significant. This proves that the leader sufficiently entrenched or rooted seeks to 
implement strategies to enhance the company. Our finding corroborates that of Stiglitz and Edlin 
(1992) stipulating that the impact of entrenchment on the company's performance is positive. 
 
It will be more interesting if we follow Bebchuk et al (2009) to build an Entrenchment index for the 
French SBF 120 companies (2001- 2013) which includes six dispositions that were most strongly 
opposed by investors institutional: 
- Classified Board 1- When this disposition named Classified or Staggered Board exists, the board is 
generally divided into three groups, one is replaced each year. 
- 2 Golden Parachutes: Golden parachutes (Golden Parachutes) are severance agreements that provide 
significant benefits to the leaders when the administration board terminates their employment, or when 
they have to resign as a result of a change of control. 
21 
 
-3- Poison Pill: Poison pills or diets of rights are allocation plans of subscription rights that give their 
holders special opportunities when an event occurs such as a hostile takeover bid. 
- 4- supermajority - mergers in percent: Qualified majority (supermajority) device that increases the 
proportion of votes required to approve a fusion , or sometimes the replacement of directors. This 
MPPC allows leaders to make fail an offer or ensure that it is sufficiently high. 
-5-  Vote % Required to Amend ByLaws.  
-6-  Vote % Required to Amend Charter. 
 
5 and 6 are the limits for the modification possibilities to the statutes (charters limits to Amend) or 
internal rules (limits to Amend bylaws). Such dispositions limit the possibilities for shareholders to 
amend the constitutional documents of companies. 
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